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III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from an Order Granting Summary Judgment entered 
by Judge L.A. Dever of the Third Judicial District Court, Division 
II, State of Utah, on August 13, 1997. A copy of the Order is 
attached at Addendum A, Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1953 as amended). 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment 
after the parties had filed conflicting affidavits as to the 
commercial reasonableness of selling a repossessed vehicle at an 
auto auction limited exclusively to wholesale dealers without any 
attempt to sell the vehicle at a higher retail price? (Issue 
Preserved at R. 45-47). 
This is a question of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. Biqqens vt Salt Lake County, 85 P. 2d 231 (Utah 
1993). No deference should be afforded to the trial court's 
conclusion that the facts were not in dispute nor the court's legal 
conclusion based on those facts. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 
458 (Utah App. 1991)(internal citations omitted). This Court 
should view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, who is the 
appellant in this case. Id. 
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2. Did the appellant produce evidence enough to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sale of a 
repossessed vehicle at an auto auction limited exclusively to 
wholesale buyers without any attempt to sell the vehicle as a 
merchant at a higher retail price was commercially reasonable? 
(Issue Preserved at R. 43-45). 
Because this matter was decided on summary judgment, the 
applicable standard of review is a correctness standard* Higgens 
v. Salt Lake County, 85 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). No deference should 
be afforded to the trial court's conclusion that the facts were not 
in dispute nor the court's legal conclusion based on those facts. 
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991) (internal 
citations omitted). This Court should view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, who is the appellant. Id. 
Vf DPTEPMXNATJVE AUTHORITIES 
Appellant submits that the following authorities are 
controlling and entitle him to judgment as a matter of law: 
STATUTES; 
Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended); 
See Addendum B for the full provision of the statute. 
Section 70A-9-507, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended); 
See Addendum B for the full provision of the statute. 
fiULSS; 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
See Addendum B for the full provision of the rule. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal very simply involves the lower court's decision to 
accept on summary judgment, despite the fact that there were 
conflicting affidavits on point, that the sale of a repossessed 
vehicle at a dealers-only auto auction with no other attempt to 
sell the vehicle for a higher retail value is commercially 
reasonable within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act. 
The case involved appellee Larry H. Miller Leasing Company's 
("Miller") repossession of appellant Karl E. Jorgenson's 
("Jorgenson") vehicle, a 1994 Plymouth Voyager van. After taking 
possession of the van, Miller made no attempt to sell the vehicle 
on its lot or by any retail means. R. 44. Instead, Miller sold 
the vehicle at an auto auction closed to the general public where 
it could only be expected to get a wholesale price. R. 45. Since 
the vehicle sold for below the value of Jorgenson's loan, Miller 
brought this action on January 21, 1997 seeking a deficiency on the 
loan value in the sum of $6,160.17. R. 45. 
Miller filed a motion for summary judgment on March 11, 1997 
supported solely by an affidavit from a manager of its collection 
department stating that the auto auction was a commercially 
reasonable means of selling the vehicle. R. 9-17. On April 28, 
1997 Jorgenson objected to the motion for summary judgment and 
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filed a counter affidavit by a used car dealer of sixteen years. 
R. 41-42. The affidavit was evidence that the usual course of 
business in the sale of a repossess vehicle was to first try to 
obtain a retail value by selling the vehicle on the sales lot, and 
that an automobile dealer would only resort to the auto auction in 
extreme situations since the value obtained for the vehicle would 
be at or below wholesale. R. 41-42. 
Despite these counter affidavits, the trial court granted 
Miller's motion for summary judgment on August 13, 1997 and awarded 
Miller the deficiency plus interest, attorney's fees and court 
costs, in the sum of $8,484.72. R. 68-69. 
On September 3, 1997 Jorgenson filed a Notice of Appeal in the 
Third District Court, Division II, to appeal the question of 
commercial reasonableness and the granting of summary judgment to 
the Utah Supreme Court. R. 77. The supreme court poured-over the 
appeal to this honorable Court of Appeals on October 29, 1997. 
Ill, STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 26, 1994 defendant/appellant Jorgenson entered into 
an agreement with Miller to lease a 1994 Plymouth Voyager van, VIN 
1P4GH44R6RX251581 by signing the lease form provided by Miller 
which gives Miller all the rights provided a secured creditor under 
the Utah Commercial Code in the event of a default. R. 19-20. 
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Miller repossessed the vehicle on November 6, 1996. R, 22. 
However, Miller made no effort to sell the vehicle publicly at any 
of its retail locations or to obtain any retail sale or value for 
the vehicle. R. 44-45. Instead, Miller simply sent the vehicle to 
the Utah Auto Auction to be sold. R. 44-45. 
The Utah Auto Auction is only open to dealers of vehicles who 
pay wholesale or less for the vehicles and thus the appellant's 
vehicle could not have been sold for its retail value. R. 41. Nor 
could appellant have attended the sale and bid on the vehicle 
himself. R. 45. 
Jorgenson was informed on December 10, 1997 that Miller had 
sold the vehicle for $11,550.00 and that Miller owed the deficiency 
balance of $6,160.17. R. 23. 
Miller brought this action in Third District Court Division II 
on January 21, 1997 to recover from Jorgenson the sum of the 
deficiency plus interest, costs and attorney's fees. R. 1-3. 
Upon filing a motion for summary judgment March 11, 1997, 
Miller offered the affidavit of Michael E. Stewart, a collection 
manager for Miller. R. 9-17. Stewart stated, among other things, 
that the sale of the vehicle through the Utah Auto Auction was "a 
commonly used method of dispossession of used vehicles and [was] 
widely accepted in the industry as an effective, commercially 
reasonable and good faith means of disposing of repossessed 
vehicles." R. 13. 
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Jorgenson objected to Stewart's affidavit as not being 
admissible since Stewart was not an automobile dealer and was not 
qualified to testify as to commercial reasonableness by a merchant 
or dealer of automobiles- R. 45. Instead, Jorgenson filed in 
opposition to the motion an affidavit by Gary Giffin, a used car 
dealer of 16 years. R. 41-42. Giffin stated in his affidavit, 
contrary to Stewart, 
the customary practice of used automobile dealers in the 
Salt Lake area and elsewhere [is] to hold the vehicle on 
a used vehicle lot, expose the same to advertising from 
the street or by newspaper for a period of time, usually 
60 to 90 days. If the vehicle does not sell within that 
period of time, then the dealer will wholesale the 
vehicle at the Salt Lake Auto Auction or a wholesale 
dealer. 
R. 42. 
The affidavits contradicted one another as to the commercial 
reasonableness of selling the vehicle at the auction without any 
exposure to the public. R. 45-46. Despite the two conflicting 
affidavits, the court below signed the Order Granting Summary 
Judgment against Jorgenson on August 13, 1997. R. 68. 
Jorgenson filed a notice appealing the summary judgment order 
on September 12, 1997. R. 77. 
8 
IX, SWMftfiY QF THE ARSWENT 
For the following reasons, the Trial Court was incorrect in 
granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. Summary judgment cannot be granted where opposing parties 
have submitted conflicting affidavits on a question of fact. 
2. Appellant objected that appellee's affidavit was made by 
one who lacked qualification to make such statements and 
determinations. However, appellee never objected to appellant's 
affidavit by used car dealer Gary Giffin, thus the Court should 
consider the appellant's affidavit admissible for purposes of 
summary judgment. 
3. Since there were conflicting affidavits which raised 
specific evidentiary facts, there was a genuine issue of material 
fact and appellee was not entitled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Appellant raised the affirmative defense that appellee 
had sold the vehicle by commercially unreasonable means contrary to 
the requirements § 70A-9-504 (3) , U.C.A., and therefore was not 
entitled to the deficiency of the loan on the vehicle, which 
appellee never disproved. 
5. The only evidence presented to the trial court as to the 
commercial reasonableness of the sale of the repossessed vehicle 
were the conflicting affidavits which alone should have precluded 
summary judgment. 
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2L AROTMEflT 
I. THE CQWT SHQULD REVERSE THE QfiPSfi GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PECAUSE THE PARTIES HAD SUBMITTED CONFLICTING AFFIDAVIT? 
THEREBY CREATING AN ISSUE OF FACT. 
The trial court's order granting summary judgment was improper 
as appellant had filed an affidavit of sufficient facts without 
objection in opposition to appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting affidavit. Conflicting affidavits create a question 
of fact which must preclude summary judgment. Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Company v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). 
Appellee, in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
offered an affidavit by an employee, Miller?s collection manager, 
Michael E. Stewart. R. 9. Stewart stated in his affidavit that 
the automobile auction is "a commonly used method of disposition of 
repossessed vehicles and is widely accepted in the industry as an 
effective, commercially reasonable and good faith means of 
disposing of repossessed vehicles." R. 14. 
Appellant objected to this affidavit in his Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment as Stewart was not an auto dealer 
and therefore was not qualified to speak with personal knowledge as 
to the usual course of business of auto dealers. R. 46. 
Instead, appellant offered the affidavit of Gary Giffin who 
had been a used car dealer for sixteen years as evidence of the 
usual course of business of an auto dealer to sell in a 
commercially reasonable manner. R. 41. Affiant Giffin1s sworn 
10 
testimony was that it was not customary for auto dealers in Utah to 
sell a repossessed vehicle at an auto auction without first trying 
to sell the vehicle on their lot for a higher retail price. R. 42. 
Thus, the two affidavits created a direct conflict over the 
commercial reasonableness of selling a repossessed car at an auto 
auction. This Court has held previously 
If, upon review of the record, it appears there is a 
dispute as to a material factual issue, we are compelled 
to reverse the trial court's determination and remand for 
further proceedings on that issue. One sworn statement 
under oath is all that is necessary to preclude the entry 
of summary judgment. 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Sghettler* 768 p.2d 950 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows an order 
of summary judgment where "[t]he pleadings, . . . together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thus, the trial court must consider all the 
pleadings and affidavits of all parties and then find that the 
material facts as presented create no genuine dispute so that the 
movant is legally entitled to relief. 
Affidavits which raise specific evidentiary facts create 
genuine issues which preclude an order of summary judgment. 
Treloagan v. Trelogaan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). All it takes, 
then, is "one sworn statement" of sufficient factual evidence to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Arnica Mutual at 957. 
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In this case, the affidavit offered by appellant set forth 
sufficient evidence of customary practice of merchants of motor 
vehicles for selling vehicles, and the commercial unreasonableness 
of relying exclusively on the Utah Auto Auction. R. 41-42. Miller 
never moved to stike appellant's affidavit nor did they object to 
the same in any way. 
With an affidavit in support of summary judgment by appellee 
to which appellant objected as being made without the appropriate 
knowledge and authority, and an affidavit in opposition to summary 
judgment offered without objection, the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment was improper and should be reversed. 
II. THE SALE OF A REPOSSESSED VEHICLE BY MEANS WHICH 
DQ NQT ATTEMPT TO GAIN THE 
SIgHEST RESALE VAI,UE IS COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLEt 
Selling a used vehicle at a dealers-only auction with no 
attempt to sell it from a used car lot, expose it to the public or 
otherwise obtain the highest selling price is not "commercially 
reasonable" under Utah Code Annotated § 70A-9-504. Appellant made 
this argument below, but the appellee never proved that selling 
appellant's repossessed vehicle through the Utah Auto Auction was 
a commercially reasonable public or private sale. Therefore, 
appellant should not have been liable for the deficiency which 
resulted from Miller's unreasonable sale. 
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Utah law requires that a repossessed vehicle be disposed of by 
the secured party in a commercially reasonable private or public 
sale. U.C.A. § 70A-9-504. The statute requires that "'every aspect 
of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and 
terms must be commercially reasonable." 
Section 70A-9-507(2) further provides that 
If the secured party either sells the collateral in 
the usual manner in any recognized market therefore or if 
he sells at the price current in such market at the time 
of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity 
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the 
type of property sold he has sold in a commercially 
reasonable manner. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a commercially reasonable 
public sale as "a sale in which the public, upon proper notice, is 
invited to participate and given full opportunity to bid upon a 
competitive basis for the property placed on sale, which is sold to 
the highest bidder." pioneer ix>dge Center Inct v. glaufrensklee/ 
649 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1982)(internal quotations omitted). The 
purpose of the 'commercially reasonable' requirement is "to get the 
best price obtainable for the truck." Maas v. Allred, 577 P.2d 
127, 128 (Utah 1978). To that end, "The requirement of a public 
invitation is essential for a public sale under the Uniform 
Commercial Code." Pioneer Dodae Center, Trie, at 30, quoting In re 
Webb, 17 UCC Rep. 627, 630 (S.D.Ohio 1975). Finally, if the sale 
"was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner, plaintiff 
is barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment." Pioneer Dodge 
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Centert Inct v. Glaubensklee at 31, citing FMA Financial CcrPt v 
Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
In Pioneer Dodge, infra, the plaintiff who repossessed 
appellant's truck, placed the vehicle for sale on its own used car 
sales lot, took it to several other car dealers who made bids on 
the vehicle, and announced to prospective buyers in its dealership 
that the vehicle would be sold for auction at the dealership. The 
Utah Supreme Court found that such actions on the part of appellee 
still did not rise to a level of commercial reasonableness. "These 
efforts do not give reasonable notice to that part of the public 
which would likely be interested in the sale." Id. at 31. 
Appellant asserted below that Miller made no effort to sell 
appellant's vehicle through a commercially reasonable sale. R. 44. 
The only means Miller used to sell the repossessed vehicle was to 
consign it to the Utah Auto Auction lot which is closed to the 
public and open only to automobile wholesale buyers. R. 44-45. 
Appellant produced evidence showing that vehicles at the auto 
auction are usually sold at or below their wholesale value. R. 41-
42. Clearly, the best price obtainable for the vehicle at a 
wholesalers-only auction would be lower than the best price 
obtainable from a true public or private sale at one of Miller's 
used car lots. As a result, Miller only obtained a price of 
$11,675.00 for the vehicle at auction. R. 23. 
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This dispute over the commercial reasonableness of appellee's 
sale of the repossessed vehicle created a substantial question of 
fact under Utah law. Thus, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. 
For the reasons and on the grounds stated above, appellant 
prays the Court to reverse the trial court's Order Granting Summary 
Judgment based upon the parties conflicting affidavits, to reverse 
the trial court's order that appellant pay appellee damages in the 
sum of $8,484.72, and to remand this case to the trial court for 
determination based upon evidence to be produced at trial of the 
commercial reasonableness of selling a repossessed vehicle at a 
dealers-only auto auction at or below wholesale rather than selling 
it publicly for the highest possible price. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of November, 1997. 
/JOHN L. McCOY 
Attorney for Appell 
_/ 
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ADDENDUM A 
Jeffrey W. Shields (USB #2948) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY H. MILLER LEASING 
COMPANY, a corporation, : 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 970000647CV 
KARL E. JORGENSON, 
: Judge L. A. Dever 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, Larry H. Miller Leasing Company ("LHM"), having filed its Motion 
for Summary Judgment in the above-captioned matter, and the Court having duly considered 
the Memoranda and Affidavits of both parties in connection with the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and having rendered its Memorandum decision in accordance with Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-501, and good cause appearing therefore, it is now by the 
Court 
223798.1 
ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be and herewith is, 
granted as requested. 
2. Based upon the grant of Summary Judgment, JUDGMENT IS 
ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AS FOLLOWS: 
A. For the principal sum of $6,160.17; 
B. For costs of this Action in the sum of $109.00; 
C. For accrued contract interest rate of 18% per annum from the date 
of the Complaint until July 15, 1997, in the sum of $539.00; 
D. For interest following entry of judgment until satisfaction thereof at 
the contract rate of 18% per annum which is $3.08 per day; 
E. For attorney's fees in the sum of $1,676.55 
FOR A TOTAL OF JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $8,484.72 
F. And it is further Ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in 
the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in collecting said judgment by 
execution or otherwise as shall be established by Affidavit. 
DATED this \j_ day of J$^, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
L.A. Dever 
District Court Ju 
223798.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I did cause on the "3 I day of July, 1997, a true 
and correct copy of an Order Granting Summary Judgment the to be mailed via U.S. 
mail, first-class postage prepaid to: 
John L. McCoy 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, #1314 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM B 
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose ot collat-
eral after default — Effect of disposition. 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or other-
wise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then condition 
or following any commercially reasonable preparation or pro-
cessing. Any sale of goods is subject to the chapter on Sales 
(Chapter 2). The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the 
order following to 
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, pre-
paring for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, 
to the extent provided for in the agreement and not 
prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal 
expenses incurred by the secured party; 
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the 
security interest under which the disposition is maoje; 
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any 
subordinate security interest in the collateral if written 
notification of demand therefor is received before distri-
bution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the 
secured party, the holder of a subordinate security inter-
est must seasonably furnish reasonable proof of his inter-
est, and unless he does so, the secured party need not 
comply with his demand. 
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the 
secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, 
unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. 
But if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or 
chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable 
for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides. 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private 
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. 
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at 
any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the 
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and 
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is 
perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a 
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable 
notification of the time and place of any public sale or 
reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale 
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the 
secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default 
a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification 
of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification 
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any 
other secured party from whom the secured party has received 
(before sending his notification to the debtor or before the 
debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of 
an interest in the collateral. The secured party may buy at any 
public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in 
a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of 
widely distributed standard price quotations he may buy at 
private sale. 
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after 
default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of 
the* debtor's rights therein, discharges the security interest 
under which it is made and any security interest or lien 
subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such 
rights and interests even though the secured party fails to 
comply with the requirements of this part or of any judicial 
proceedings 
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no 
knowledge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy 
in collusion with the secured party, other bidders or the 
person conducting the sale; or 
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith. 
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a 
guaranty, indorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and 
who receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party or 
is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties 
of the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale 
or disposition of the collateral under this chapter. 1977 
70A-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to com-
ply with this part. e 
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceed-
ing in accordance with the provisions of this part disposition 
may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and 
conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any 
person entitled to notification or whose security interest has 
been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition 
has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused 
by a failure to comply with the provisions of this part. If the 
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover 
in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge 
plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the 
time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price. 
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by 
a sale at a different time or in a different method from that 
selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to 
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially 
reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the 
collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market 
therefor or if he sells at the price current in such market at the 
time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with 
reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of 
property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with 
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other 
types of disposition. A disposition which has been approved in 
any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' commit-
tee or representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed 
to be commercially reasonable, but this sentence does not 
indicate that any such approval must be obtained in any case 
nor does it indicate that any disposition not so approved is not 
commercially reasonable. 1966 
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Rule 56, Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant, A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not folly adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing: that 
there is a genuine issue for triad. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
